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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CRISIS: PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA
Milena Sterio*
The rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia over the last five years
has been spectacular, amounting to a true crisis in international law. Dur-
ing the first six months of 2011, Somali pirates attacked 163 ships and took
361 sailors hostage. As of June 30, 2011, Somali pirates were holding 20
ships and 420 crew members, demanding millions of dollars in ransom for
their release. Moreover, pirates have been attacking larger ships, such as
oil tankers, and using more potent weapons, such as rocket-propelled gre-
nades and automatic weapons. Pirates have also been attacking during
monsoon season, an otherwise risky endeavor. According to the Interna-
tional Maritime Bureau Director, Pottengal Mukundan, "[i]n the last six
months, Somali pirates attacked more vessels than ever before and they're
taking higher risks." In sum, piracy has increased shipping expenses, cost-
ing an estimated $10 billion per year in global trade.
What has sparked this international law crisis off the coast of So-
malia? Moreover, what can the international community do in order to al-
leviate the crisis and prevent piracy from spreading to other regions of the
world? What should be the way forward? This paper will briefly address
these issues by focusing first on the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia,
before turning to an examination of international law on maritime piracy,
and by finally suggesting some solutions for the future in the global fight
against piracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia over the last five years
has been spectacular, amounting to a true crisis in international law. During
the first six months of 2011, Somali pirates attacked 163 ships and took 361
sailors hostage.' As of June 30, 2011, Somali pirates were reported to have
20 ships and 420 crewmembers captive and were demanding millions of
dollars in ransom for their release.2 Moreover, pirates have been attacking
larger ships, such as oil tankers, using more potent weapons, such as rocket-
propelled grenades and automatic weapons. Pirates have also been attacking
during monsoon season, an otherwise risky endeavor. According to the
International Maritime Bureau Director, Pottengal Mukundan, "[iln the last
six months, Somali pirates attacked more vessels than ever before and
they're taking higher risks."4 In sum, piracy has increased shipping ex-
penses, costing an estimated £10 billion per year in global trade.s
What has sparked this international law crisis off the coast of Soma-
lia? Moreover, what can the international community do in order to alleviate
the crisis and prevent piracy from spreading to other regions of the world?
What should be the way forward?
II. BACKGROUND: PROLIFERATION OF PIRACY IN SOMALIA IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
Many signs point to Somalia being a failed state.6 The country has
lacked a stable government since 1991 and has been plagued by civil war
and violence, and famine has been rampant over the last few years. 7 An
1 Pirate Attacks at Sea Getting Bigger and Bolder, Says IMB Report, ICC COMMERCIAL
CRIME SERVICES (July 14, 2011), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/450-pirate-attacks-at-sea-
getting-bigger-and-bolder-says-imb-report.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
Michael Nicholson, Spirit of Adventure: Behind the Rise of the Somali Pirates,
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/8298095/Spirit-of-
Adventure-Behind-the-rise-of-the-Somali-pirates.html.
6 See, e.g., Milena Sterio, The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a
Global Solution, 59 AM.. U. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (2010).
Id.; see also Death Toll Rises as Violence Rocks Somali Capital, CNN (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-1 1/world/somalia.fighting-l-somali-captial-queda-rebels?_s
=PM:WORLD; see also James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the
Sword, 25 WORLD POL'Y J. 41, 46 (2008) (describing the Somali state as an "empty shell");
see also Jason Straziuso, US: 29,000 Somali Children Under 5 Dead in Famine, MSNBC
(Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44021514/ns/worldnews-africa/t/us-somali-
children-under-dead-famine/ (noting that over 29,000 Somali children have died because of
drought and famine).
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average Somali person earns $600 per year.8 In this cowboy climate of vio-
lence and poverty, piracy has thrived-perhaps unexpectedly. Pirates oper-
ate out of coastal Somali towns, where they are able to dock their own skiffs
freely, and where they haul back their hijacked property and hostages.9
Coastal towns in Somalia benefit economically from the proceeds of piracy
and thus have no incentive to participate in anti-piracy operations.' 0 The
Somali government has no effective control of the various coastal regions
where pirates operate, and is unable to respond with any effective law en-
forcement or military operation against pirates." Reports indicate that pi-
racy is supported by powerful Somali warlords, who exercise control over
their respective regions of influence, and who routinely finance pirate at-
tacks and reap the benefits thereof in case of a successful hijacking and ran-
som payment.12 Until recently, international patrol ships sailing through the
Indian Ocean have had no authority to enter the Somali territorial waters in
pursuit of pirates, and no authority to penetrate the Somali land.'3 Thus,
until recently, pirates operated with impunity within Somalia, and unless
they were captured in the Indian Ocean, were able to complete their hijack-
ing operation and, in many instances, earn multi-million dollar ransoms. It
was not until 2008 that the U.N.'s involvement with anti-piracy efforts
ended the Somali pirates' ability to operate with almost no repercussions.
8 Sterio, supra note 6, at 1451.
9 Id.
1o See Mohamed Ahmed, Somali Sea Gang Lures Investors at Pirate Lair, REUTERS (Dec.
1, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/01/us-somalia-piracy-investors-idUSTRE5
B01Z920091201 (explaining that pirates have set up "maritime companies" in coastal vil-
lages, which have become the main profitable economic activity in the area).
1 See, e.g., Kraska & Wilson, supra note 7, at 45-46; Eugene Kontorovich, International
Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 6, 2009),
http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm.
12 See Ahmed, supra note 10 (describing pirate exchanges, where local Somalis can invest
in the piracy industry by contributing money or weapons to pirates and the investor then
receives a share of ransom money in the case of a successful pirate attack); see also The
Spoils of Piracy, NEPTUNE MAR. SECURITY (May 8, 2011), http://neptunemaritimesecurity.
posterous.com/the-spoils-of-piracy (noting that among people benefiting from the proceeds
of piracy are government officials).
13 Under international law, littoral states' territorial waters, which stretch out 12 nautical
miles, are a sovereign part of the littoral state, and no other state has the authority to pene-
trate the littoral state's territorial sea. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, arts. 2, 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Article 2 of
UNCLOS states that "the sovereignty of a coastal state extends ... to an adjacent belt of sea,
described as the territorial sea." Article 3 of UNCLOS limits the breadth of coastal states'
territorial seas to 12 nautical miles.
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The pirate modus operandi has been relatively simple. Pirates con-
gregate on a mothership and from there launch attacks using tiny skiffs. 14
Armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades (and in some instances,
primitive weapons such as knives and small guns), pirates hijack victim
vessels and sail them back to Somali ports.' 5 Pirates often demand millions
of dollars for the release of their victims from shipping companies and even
the victims' home states. 16
Pirates and their warlords have prospered significantly in recent
years. A single successful pirate attack can yield thousands of dollars to an
individual pirate.18 Compared to the meager yearly income that average
Somalis earn, it is understandable why piracy attracts so many young So-
mali men. Latest reports on piracy indicate that pirates are driven primarily
by financial gain, and that pirates and warlords that often finance their op-
erations have been prospering noticeably. 19
In light of the significant security and financial concerns caused by
Somali piracy, the international community became involved in major anti-
piracy operations starting in 2008. However, combating piracy continues to
pose several difficult issues for international law and international institu-
tions.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PIRACY
The above-described Somali piracy crisis has sparked a response by
the international community. Faced with economic harm and the security
threat posed by Somali pirates over the last decade, major maritime nations
have begun anti-piracy operations on several fronts. Some of these opera-
tions have required modifications to the traditional rules of international law
rules, in order to enable piracy-fighting nations to catch and prosecute pi-
rates effectively.
14 Todd Pitman, Ending Somali Piracy: Few Options for US Forces, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Apr. 14, 2009), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009052659_appiracy
fewoptions.html.
15 Suspected Pirates Rescued in GulfofAden, CNN (Dec. 4, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com
/2008-12-04/world/yemen.pirateslpirate-attack-intemational-maritime-bureau-danish-
navy?_s=PM:WORLD.
16 See Caroline Copley, Somali Piracy Becoming "Criminal Enterprise," REUTERS (Feb.
16, 2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/somaliaNews/idAFLDE71F27E20110216 (stating that
pirates are now demanding between $4.5 million to $5 million in ransom per ship).
1 See, e.g., Sterio, supra note 6, at 1451 (reporting that an individual pirate can receive up
to $150,000 for a single seized ship); see also Ahmed, supra note 10 (citing a single pirate
investor who earned $75,000 in 38 days).
18 Kontorovich, supra note 11 (describing how in Somalia, the per capita GDP is $600
compared to pirates earning $150,000 in a single seizure).
19 Copley, supra note 16.
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First, major maritime nations created several patrolling fleets,
which routinely sail through the Gulf of Aden and which have succeeded in
warding off numerous attempted pirate attacks.20 International law in its
traditional incarnation created a hurdle for the patrolling nations. Under the
international rule of the law of the seas, every nation has the right to capture
pirates on the high seas.21 The high seas are defined as the body of water
stretching beyond the twelve-nautical mile territorial sea of littoral states.22
Patrolling nations, under international law, do not have the right to enter any
nation's territorial sea.23 Thus, if Somali pirates hijacked a victim vessel on
the high seas but then quickly retreated into Somali territorial waters, patrol-
ling nations were powerless to chase and stop them. Geography immensely
helped pirates and undermined anti-piracy operations. In fact, the Gulf of
Aden, where most pirate attacks took place in the beginning of the Somali
piracy surge, is a narrow body of water, enabling pirates to speedily reach
Somali territorial waters after a successful attack.24
In order to remedy this problem, the U.N. Security Council passed
several resolutions, beginning in 2008, which authorized patrolling nations
to enter Somali territorial waters, to chase pirates after the original piracy
encounter, and to even enter Somali land.2 5 These Security Council resolu-
tions modified existing international law rules with respect to Somalia and
have contributed tremendously toward the success of anti-piracy opera-
tions.26
20 Sterio, supra note 6, at 1479.
21 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 105 ("On the high seas, or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship . . . and arrest the persons and
seize the property on board.").
22 See id. art. 3.
23 See id. art 2.
24 See Kontorovich, supra note 11.
25 S.C. Res. 1851, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (allowing for one year,
states and regional organizations cooperating to end piracy off the cost of Somalia, the ability
to undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia to suppress piracy) [here-
inafter Resolution 1851]; S.C. Res. 1846, 1 10(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008)
(authorizing states to enter Somali territorial waters for the purpose of repressing acts of
piracy) [hereinafter Resolution 1846]; S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20,
2008) (creating requirements for U.N. member states to stop the transfer of money that they
suspect will be involved in Somali piracy acts) [hereinafter Resolution 1844]; S.C. Res.
1838, 2, 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008) (calling on U.N. member states to assist
in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia) [hereinafter Resolution
1838]; S.C. Res. 1816, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008) (authorizing states to enter
Somali territorial waters for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy) [hereinafter Resolution
1816].
26 These resolutions specify that they are not supposed to modify existing customary rules
in general, but rather, only apply to Somalia and only give broader use of force rights to the
patrolling nations operating in the Gulf of Aden. Thus, no general modification of intema-
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Second, major maritime nations faced hurdles caused by interna-
tional law's narrow definition of piracy. The infamous United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") defined piracy as a violent
attack taking place on the high seas, involving two vessels (the victim vessel
and the aggressor vessel) and "committed for private ends."27 This defini-
tion has been widely accepted as representing customary law. 2 8 Unfortu-
nately, its approach and definition of piracy is narrow. First, piracy must
occur on the high seas. If Somali pirates hijack a vessel in the Somali terri-
torial sea, this act would not qualify as piracy under UNCLOS. 2 9 Thus, al-
though patrolling nations may have the right to enter Somali territorial wa-
ters for the purpose of preventing pirate attacks, if attacks take place in such
waters, they would not even amount to piracy under international law. Sec-
ond, a pirate attack must involve two vessels: a victim and an aggressor
vessel. This could be problematic for situations in which pirates attempt to
board the victim vessel in its last port of entry and then hijack it on the high
seas. 3 0 In such a case, although the hijacking strongly resembles piracy, it
would not qualify as such under traditional international law. Third, the act
of piracy must be committed for private aims. Should pirates be linked to a
political cause or should they operate on behalf of a state entity, their acts
would not qualify as piracy under international law. 3 1 The latter two limita-
tional law rules can be implied from these Security Council resolutions. See Sterio, supra
note 6, at 1474. (listing five reasons why the U.N. resolutions are limited in scope).
27 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 101.
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal act of violence, detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,
and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against per-
sons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons
or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
Id.
28 See, e.g., Jon D. Peppetti, Building the Global Maritime Security Network: A Multina-
tional Legal Structure to Combat Transnational Threats, 55 NAVAL L. REv. 73, 91-92
(2008).
29 Id. at 92-93.
30 Sterio, supra note 6, at 1468.
31 Many scholars believe that the "private aims" requirement in UNCLOS disqualifies acts
committed for political, religious, ideological, or ethnic reasons from the definition of piracy.
See, e.g., Peppetti, supra note 28, at 92 (describing the "private ends" restriction as too limit-
ing for modem terrorism motivations); see also Lawrence Azubuike, International Law
Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 52 (2009) (describing general
views that piracy does not include acts of violence committed on religious or ethnic grounds
or for political reasons); but see Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A
Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,
27-28 (2007) (arguing that terrorist acts can qualify as piracy if the terrorists are not com-
missioned by a specific state).
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tions on the definition of piracy have not been particularly problematic in
the Somali context, as most pirate attacks have involved an aggressor
41 32
"skiff," and because pirates seem to be driven by pure financial gain.
However, should their modus operandi or their motivation change, the
UNCLOS definition could pose hurdles in the anti-piracy operations by
excluding numerous violent acts from this treaty's coverage.
In order to broaden the scope of anti-piracy operations, maritime
nations have been forced to resort to other sources of international law. Na-
tions that are members of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA Convention" or
"SUA") have been relying on this treaty's more expansive coverage of
maritime violence.33 Under SUA, piracy is not defined as such, but rather, it
is viewed as one of many different possible acts of maritime violence which
are prohibited by this convention. 34 Such acts of prohibited maritime vio-
lence can take place anywhere, as long as the victim vessel is in some form
of international transit.35 Moreover, such prohibited acts can involve only
one vessel, and they can be committed for any aim, including political and
state-sponsored violence. In fact, "[t]he SUA Convention illustrates the
modern-day approach to piracy and the need to broaden its definition to
encompass maritime aggression and terrorism, as opposed to confining its
definition to the out-dated scope of sea robbery."36 The Security Council has
repeatedly called for member states of this convention to fully implement it
and to rely on it extensively when fighting Somali piracy. 37 Second, piracy-
fighting nations could in the future rely on other anti-terrorist conventions,
such as the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
32 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
3 See J. Ashley Roach, Countering Piracy off Somalia: International Law and Interna-
tional Institutions, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 397, 406 (2010) (discussing how agreements like the
SUA Convention "provide additional means of inflicting consequences on Somali pirates ...
by addressing certain gaps in the law of piracy . . . ."); see generally Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988,
1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA Convention].
34 See SUA Convention, supra note 33, art. 3 (defining the "offense" as a number of dif-
ferent acts that could be terrorism or piracy, and not limiting the offense to the customary
definition of piracy).
3 Id. art. 3.
36 Sterio, supra note 6, at 1462.
37 See, e.g., Resolution 1846, supra note 25, [ 15 (urging States parties to the SUA con-
vention to fully implement their obligations against Somali pirates); see also Resolution
1851, supra note 25, at preamble (reiterating that the SUA Convention provides that parties
establish procedures for prosecuting pirates); see also S.C. Res. 1950, 1 19, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010).
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Crime." These options may become indispensable when dealing with the
third hurdle caused by traditional international law: the non-matching juris-
dictional rules for the capture and prosecution of pirates.
Under UNCLOS, any nation has the right to capture pirates on the
high seas. 3 9 The capturing nation also has the right, under this convention,
to prosecute pirates. 40 However, UNCLOS does not specifically condone
the right for capturing nations to transfer pirates to third states for prosecu-
tion purposes. Many scholars have written on this issue: some have con-
cluded that UNCLOS precludes pirate transfers to third states for prosectfL
tion, while some have argued that nothing in UNCLOS specifically prohib-
its such transfers, and that such transfers ought to be permitted in order to
broaden the scope of anti-piracy measures. 4 1 This point is particularly im-
portant because while many nations have been willing to capture pirates,
most are not willing to prosecute them in their domestic courts. Piracy
prosecutions are generally viewed as politically and logistically challenging
and costly, and most nations have been unwilling to spend time and money
on such burdensome investigative and prosecutorial efforts.42 Some pirates
have been tried in domestic courts of the capturing nation, but most of those
prosecutions occurred after pirates directly threatened the national interests
of the prosecuting state by attempting to attack one of its vessels or to hijack
one of its nationals.43 Instances of Somali pirates' prosecutions based on
true universal jurisdiction have been extremely rare." Thus, capturing states
have been facing a difficult issue: what to do with captured pirates in in-
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S.
205; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, 39 I.L.M. 270; United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
39 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 105.
4 Id. ("The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties
to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, air-
craft or property . . . .").
41 For the view that UNCLOS prohibits the transfer of pirates by the capturing state to
third states for prosecution purposes, compare Kontorovich, supra note 11 (UNCLOS pro-
hibits the transfer of pirates by the capturing state to a third state for prosecution purposes),
with Azubuike, supra note 31, at 54-55 (UNCLOS does not specifically prohibit transfer of
pirates to third states because the jurisdiction of the capturing state is merely permissive and
pirates are subject to universal jurisdiction) and Roach, supra note 33, at 404 (arguing that
UNCLOS does not specifically prohibit the transfer of pirates to third states for prosecution).
42 See Kontorovich, supra note 11 ("[I]n practice, the nations patrolling the Gulf of Aden
have chosen not to prosecute pirates because of the anticipated difficulty and expense.").
43 See generally Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Univer-
sal Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM.. J. INT'L L. 436, 436 (2010) (examining different coun-
tries' exercise of jurisdiction over Somali pirates).
4 Id. at 445 (concluding that prosecution rates for pirates under universal jurisdiction were
at only 1.47% from 1998-2009).
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stances where the capturing state is unwilling to prosecute them in its own
courts, and where international law may prohibit a transfer to a third state.4 5
Some NATO countries have routinely released captured pirates, resulting in
a catch-and-release attitude which has only exacerbated the piracy problem
in Somalia.46 Russia, for example, has even resorted to drastic measures:
after a Russian ship captured Somali pirates, they were released on a tiny
boat in the middle of the Indian Ocean, with no food, water, or navigation
devices.47 The fate of these pirates remains unknown, but even Russian au-
thorities have acknowledged that these Somalis probably died.4 8 This atti-
tude is far from desirable, but nonetheless illustrates the frustration that
some piracy-fighting nations have experienced when dealing with captured
pirates.
Possible solutions to this issue include promoting a broader inter-
pretation of UNCLOS and customary law, arguing that international law
does not specifically prohibit capturing states from transferring pirates to
third states for prosecution, or reliance on other conventions, such as SUA
and other anti-terrorism treaties, which do not limit capturing states to
prosecution in their own courts. Most piracy-fighting nations have preferred
to transfer pirates to third states for prosecution purposes, and have crea-
tively circumvented the restraints of international law by relying on broader
definitions of piracy described above.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD?
Many piracy-fighting nations have preferred to use regional part-
ners in their efforts, such as Kenya, the Seychelles and Mauritius. Addition-
ally, these nations have transferred captured pirates to the national courts of
the regional partner states. 49 In Kenya, a specialized piracy court was cre-
ated in Mombasa where numerous pirates have faced prosecution.5 0 Similar
options are being explored in the Seychelles and in Mauritius, which are
45 See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 11 (noting that states which are signatories to certain
human rights treaties, such as the European Convention for Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, may also have a non-refoulement obligation
not to send pirates to a third state if there is a risk that they will be mistreated or abused
there).
46 Id. ("The dominant approach has been to avoid capturing pirates in the first place, or, if
captured, releasing the pirates without charging them with a crime.").
47 Freed Somali Pirates 'Probably Died' - Russian Source, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil8675978.stm.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Kenya's Piracy Prosecutions, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 416,
416-17 (2010) (noting that Kenya has concluded agreements on the prosecution of suspected
pirates with the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Denmark).
5o Id. at 417.
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Indian Ocean island-nations potentially affected by the Somali piracy cri-
sis.5' Some scholars have advocated the creation of an ad-hoc international
piracy tribunal to prosecute all captured pirates.52
The U.N. has been involved in the piracy crisis as well, and it will
likely continue to play an important role in the future. As mentioned above,
the U.N. Security Council has passed several resolutions addressing piracy
in Somalia.53 Lately, the U.N. has been specifically concerned with deter-
mining the best prosecution venue for captured pirates. Toward this end, the
U.N. summoned Jack Lang, a French politician, to study the issue and pro-
duce a report, which was published in January 2011,54 The Jack Lang report
recommended the creation of a Somali extra-territorial court. 5 In other
words, the report advocated for a Somali national prosecution of Somali
pirates, while recognizing the difficulty of establishing a functioning tribu-
nal in war-torn Somalia.5 6 Thus, the report recommended that the tribunal
be established in the neighboring country of Tanzania. This tribunal would
apply Somali law and function as a purely national jurisdiction, but its
headuarters would be located outside of Somalia for obvious security rea-
sons. ' While this solution appeared attractive initially, it has faced resis-
tance from Somalia, and without Somali support for the establishment of a
Somali court, it seems that this option will not receive much support in the
future.5 9 It is thus possible that piracy-fighting nations will turn more in-
51 International Cooperation with Seychelles Crucial Against Maritime Piracy,
INTERPOL Chief Tells Country's Authorities, INTERPOL (June 20, 2011), http://www.inter
pol.int/Public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR201 1/PRO52.asp (describing anti-piracy efforts in the
Seychelles); Mauritius to Host Second Regional Ministerial Conference on Piracy, REPUBLIC
OF MAURITIUS (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/Mainhomepage/menuitem.a
42b24128104d9845dabdddl54508a0c/?contentid=f6dd3f5f7e6ca2 1OVgnVCM1000000aO4
a8cORCRD (describing anti-piracy efforts in Mauritius).
52 See Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More is Needed,
33 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 372, 395-96 (2010); see also Peppetti, supra note 28, at 148 (sug-
gesting that the semi-internationalized tribunals be vested with universal jurisdiction to try
piracy cases).
53 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
54 Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to piracy off the Coast
of Somalia, Rep. of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan.
25, 2011) [hereinafter Jack Lang Report].
" Id. 122.
56 Id. U 104-08 (recommending the creation of an extra-territorial Somali court as well as
supplementing Somali law by including the offense of piracy).
" Id. 122.
5 Id. (promoting three main advantages of the extra-territorial court, including strengthen-
ing the rule of law in Somalia, garnering international support for the rule of law Somalia,
and promoting existing tribunals).
5 UN Outlines Judicial Options to Fight Piracy off Somalia, ScOOP.coM (June 22, 2011),
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WOI 106/S00508/un-outlines-judicial-options-to-fight-piracy
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tently toward identifying stable regional partners, in addition to Kenya,
which could handle large-scale piracy prosecutions.
Moreover, the U.N. established the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia (the "Contact Group"), a group of state representatives of
various specialties which meets several times per year and which has been
working on promoting solutions for the Somali piracy crisis. 6 0 It is possible
that the Contact Group will in the future work more closely with shipping
61industry representatives toward identifying the best anti-piracy measures.
The optimal solution may be to proliferate patrols in the Indian Ocean, to
encourage all patrolling nations to capture pirates whenever possible, and to
prosecute all captured pirates in the national courts of identified regional
partners. Regional partners could, in turn, receive monetary assistance from
major maritime states and the shipping industry itself.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, piracy in Somalia is here to stay. Instead of hoping that pi-
racy will disappear on its own, the global community should focus on find-
ing the most adequate solutions to lower the number of pirate attacks. The
discussion above highlights some of the legal and practical steps that have
already been undertaken. Such steps include increased maritime patrols in
the Indian Ocean, routine arrests of apprehended pirates, and a concerted
effort among patrolling nations to find the most adequate tribunal to prose-
cute such pirates. If all of these steps are routinely exercised by piracy-
fighting countries, piracy incidents will most likely be reduced in number,
frequency and scope. Moreover, serious anti-piracy efforts in Somalia may
be effective in preventing the proliferation of piracy in other regions in Af-
rica or elsewhere. Major maritime nations should ensure that pirates do not
become hostis humani generi in the 2Is' century.
-off-somalia.htm (noting that the Somali Transitional Government does not support the es-
tablishment of a Somali court outside of Somalia, and that it prefers the establishment of any
piracy court within Somalia).
6 Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia Meets in New York, U.S. DEP'T STATE (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/
ps/2010/11/150695.htm.
61 Id. (identifying the Contact Group achievements working with the shipping industry to
develop measures which merchant ships can undertake to deter or delay pirate attacks).
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